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COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION 
A. Leo Levin* 
In his 1982 State of the Judiciary address, Chief Justice Warren E. 
Burger focused on arbitration as "a better way" to resolve a wide range 
of civil disputes than the formal trials that today clog our courts. 1 
Arbitration indeed promises dispatch, economy, and user satisfaction. 
Understandably, it has become increasingly popular in the commercial 
world. 
Arbitration, as an alternative to litigation, is voluntary in its most 
common form. Its use depends on the consent of the parties and, once 
agreed to, is binding. In order to cope with an ever-increasing flood 
of litigation, some courts have used arbitration in a different form 
- a court-annexed procedure - to resolve civil litigation already com-
menced. Court-annexed arbitration is unlike traditional arbitration in 
several ways: it is mandatory rather than voluntary; the arbitrators . 
are typically assigned by a third party rather than chosen by the parties; 
and the award is not binding. Typically, the procedure is imposed upon 
litigants by statute and by rule. Moreover, court-annexed arbitration 
is a method of dealing with civil litigation subsequent to the filing of 
the case while traditional arbitration occurs prior to the institution of 
the lawsuit. 
Court-annexed arbitration is utilized more extensively today than ever 
before. It commands widespread and increasing interest, not only 
because it serves the litigants well, but also because it offers to 
beleaguered courts a measure of relief from seriously overburdened 
dockets. This Article examines the use of court-annexed arbitration 
as an alternative method of dispute resolution. Part I describes how 
court-annexed arbitration works and the goals it is designed to achieve. 
Part II focuses on what the actual experience with court-annexed 
arbitration has been. Utilizing data from a recent empirical study on 
court-annexed arbitration by the Federal Judicial Center, this section 
sets forth the elements that are critical to the success of a model court-
* Director, Federal Judicial Center. B.A., 1939, Yeshiva College; J.D., 1942, University of 
Pennsylvania; LL.D., 1960, Yeshiva University; LL.D., 1980, New York Law School. Member, 
ABA Action Commission to Reduce Court Costs and Delay. The opinions expressed in this arti-
cle are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal Judicial Center or the Action 
Commission. I am indebted to Denise D. Colliers, Assistant to the Director of the Federal Judicial 
Center, for her invaluable assistance. 
I. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 276 (1982). 
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annexed arbitration plan and discusses the general advantages a court-
annexed approach holds over traditional formal trial proceedings. 
I. OPERATION AND PROCEDURE 
Although prov1s1ons governing court-annexed arbitration vary in 
detail, they generally have certain basic features in common. 2 Typically, 
they require that certain classes of civil cases be ref erred for arbitra-
tion prior to trial.. Cases subject to mandatory referral are generally 
those involving personal injury or contract actions in which no more 
than a specified dollar limit is demanded. When court-annexed arbitra-
tion was first instituted in Pennsylvania a quarter of a century ago, 
the limit was fixed at $1000; 1 when the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California launched a pilot arbitration pro-
gram in 1978, it set the limit at $100,000. 4 Furthermore, the arbitra-
tion hearing is generally conducted as an informal trial, in which a 
panel of three arbitrators - lawyers who have agreed to serve - hear 
evidence and arguments and render a decision. A dissatisfied party may 
reject the decision by demanding a formal trial (or "trial de novo"). 
If so appealed, s the case is treated as though there had been no 
arbitration; where the claim is one triable by a jury, the right to jury 
trial remains. 
It was originally thought that some financial sanction should be im-
posed ''to serve as a brake or deterrent on the taking of frivolous and 
wholly unjustified appeals. " 6 Fashioning an appropriate sanction has 
not been easy, nor has there been ready agreement on the circumstances 
calling for imposition of sanctions. A nonrecoverable payment, im-
posed upon the appealing party, in the amount of the fees of the ar-
bitrators was the Pennsylvania pattern a quarter of a century 
2. See generally Connolly & Smith, Description of Major Characteristics of the Rules for 
Selected Court-Annexed Mediation/Arbitration Programs, ABA Comm. to Reduce Court Costs 
and Delay (1982). See also McEwen & Maidman, Mediation and Arbitration: Their Promise 
and Performance as Alternatives to Court, in THE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL REFORM 61 (P. Dubois 
ed. 1982). 
3. See Smith Case, 381 Pa. 223, 234, 112 A.2d 625, 635 (1955), appeal dismissed sub nom. 
Smith v. Wissler, 350 U.S. 858 (1955). The Common Pleas Court for Philadelphia County recently 
increased the limit for arbitration fees to $20,000. 
4. N.D. CAL. TEMP. LOCAL R. 500-2(a)(i)(A), reprinted in A. LIND & J. SHAPARD, EVALUA-
TION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 112 (1981) [hereinafter 
cited as A. LIND & J. SHAPARD). 
5. The trial is in no sense an appeal, though the demand for trial is usually referred to that 
way, for the task of the court is not to examine the proceedings below to see whether they are 
tainted by error, but rather to make a fresh determination of facts and applicable law as it 
would in any case that had not been the subject of a hearing before arbitrators. 
6. Smith Case, 381 Pa. 223, 233, 112 A.2d 625, 630 (1955), appeal dismissed sub nom. Smith 
v. Wissler, 350 U.S. 858 (1955). 
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ago. 1 At that time the fee for each arbitrator was $25, but the amount in 
controversy was usually quite limited. The concern of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court at that time about the nonrecoverable payments was 
the possibility of a chilling effect on the right to jury trial. The court, 
however, solved the problem by suggesting that, particularly in situa-
tions where only $250 were at stake, arbitrators should be satisfied 
with less. The sacrifice involved, the court suggested, "is undoubtedly 
one that lawyers will cheerfully make." 8 Today, arbitrators' fees have 
escalated, but so have the amounts in controversy. Where $50,000 is 
at stake9 and with the cost of litigation such that fees of $225 per ar-
bitration panel do not loom large, it is doubtful that so small a sum 
serves as a serious deterrent. It may, however, be possible to provide 
a more significant deterrent. Consider, for example, the deterrent ef-
fect if parties were required to pay for the total costs of the action, 
including fees for attorneys, such payment being conditioned upon 
failure of the appealing party to gain a substantial advantage from 
the appeal. 1 0 
Experimentation with sanctions will no doubt continue. Some have 
viewed appropriate sanctions as an essential ingredient of a successful 
program of compulsory arbitration. 11 No consensus, however, has yet 
emerged, and successful programs do appear possible with minimal 
sanctions. 
II. THE DYNAMICS OF A SUCCESSFUL PROGRAM 
Pennsylvania first instituted court-annexed arbitration in 1951. The 
enabling act provided that the county courts of common pleas could, 
at their option, provide for mandatory arbitration in cases involving 
$1000 or less, and in relatively short order it was adopted for use 
in approximately fifty counties of that state. 12 Currently, court-mandated 
arbitration is being used in nine states, the District of Columbia, and 
two United States district courts. 13 Use of this procedure has increased 
dramatically during the past decade. The growing popularity of court-
annexed arbitration is itself testimony to a series of successful ex-
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 232-33. 
9. E.D. PA. LOCAL C1v. R. 49 § 3(2)(8), reprinted in A. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 4. 
10. See, e.g., E.D. M1cH. LOCAL R. 32. JO (a mediation program modeled after a state court 
provision and therefore limited to diversity cases). 
II. See generally D. HENSLER, A. LIPSON & E. ROLPH, JUDICIAL ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA: 
THE FIRST YEAR 17-18 (1981). 
12. See A. LEVIN & E. WOOLLEY, DISPATCH AND DELAY: A FIELD STUDY OF JUDICIAL Ao-
MINISTRATION IN PENNSYLVANIA 45-46 (1961). 
13. See Connolly & Smith, supra note 2. The United States District Court for Connecticut 
has since terminated its arbitration program. 
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periences. Speaking of the Pennsylvania program, Chief Justice Burger 
recently observed the impact on court backlog: "In Philadelphia in 
the first two years after the jurisdictional level was increased to $10,000, 
the entire civil calendar backlog was reduced from 48 months to 21 
months. In 1974 more than 12,000 of approximately 16,000 civil cases 
were resolved through arbitration." 14 At present, the Philadelphia bar 
considers the state court program "highly effective." 1 s "Without 
arbitration in Philadelphia,'' the chancellor of the Philadelphia Bar 
Association wrote in 1981, "we would have chaos." 16 
The success of the Pennsylvania state court program, however, did 
not necessarily make for a hearty reception of the federal court-annexed 
arbitration program in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. When 
the federal court in Philadelphia first proposed court-annexed arbitra-
tion with a jurisdictional limit of $50,000, there was some resistance 
on the part of the bar. Since its initial introduction, the court-annexed 
arbitration in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has received more 
favorable reactions. 
In other circumstances, local interests and local conditions have in-
fluenced the bench's and the bar's reception to arbitration programs. 
Compulsory arbitration in the state courts of California has been 
characterized as "popular, but no panacea." 11 In the same vein, one 
report concluded that court-annexed arbitration did not "appear to 
have major promise as a solution ... [but] seems to have made friends 
... and perhaps more important, it seems to have made no enemies." 18 
Nevertheless, not all opinion has been favorable. One federal court, 
for example, abandoned court-annexed arbitration in favor of another 
procedure designed to reduce the number of trials and to dispose of 
cases more expeditiously. 19 
The principal feature of court-annexed arbitration is the large number 
of adjudicators it makes available to supplement judges. Lawyers who 
are willing to serve as arbitrators are almost invariably in plentiful 
supply. In 1968, Frank Zal, Arbitration Commissioner for the County 
Court of Philadelphia, referred to his division as "a tribunal with the 
largest amount of judicial manpower in the world." 20 He was not far 
14. Burger, supra note I, at 277. 
15. Letter from Joseph H. Foster, Chancellor of the Philadelphia Bar Association, to A. 
L. Levin, August 17, 1981, (on file with the Journal of Law Reform). 
16. Id. 
17. Judicial Arbitration in California, 5 RAND RESEARCH REV., Fall 1981, at 3. 
18. Id. at 6 (quoting D. HENSLER, A. LIPSON & E. ROLPH, supra note 11). 
19. This was true of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. See 
Shapard, Updated Analysis of Court-Annexed Arbitration in Three Federal District Courts 5 
(Feb. 17, 1982) (memorandum to be published in 1983) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform). 
For the original study see A. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 4. 
20. Zal, Decade of Compulsory Arbitration Reviewed by Commissioner Zal, THE LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 2, 1968, at I, II, reprinted in F. ZAL, STATISTICAL REPORT AND EXPLANATORY 
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from the mark. By 1982, with eligibility for appointment as an ar-
bitrator made more stringent, 3200 lawyers had volunteered and 
qualified in Philadelphia alone. 21 Professor Rosenberg has made the 
same point in describing court-annexed arbitration as "a way to stretch 
the supply of judges when the legislature refuses to appropriate funds 
for additional judges who are sorely needed." 22 Thus, if this veritable 
army of adjudicators - 1000 panels in a single city - is properly 
tapped, the obvious effect will be to avoid the long delays that are 
typical of crowded and overburdened metropolitan courts. 
There is a second benefit that accrues from adding to the supply 
of adjudicators. By reducing delay and bringing the day of threatened 
adjudication closer, arbitration makes for earlier settlement. To 
understand the significance of this contribution, it is important to be 
aware of how few civil cases actually go to trial and of the dynamics 
of the settlement process. In the federal system, -for example, over 93 
civil cases out of every 100 - jury and nonjury - are terminated before 
trial. 23 In less than 7<1/o is a trial even commenced. Dispositive motions 
account for some terminations; voluntary dismissals also play a part. 
Settlements, however, appear to account for the great preponderance 
of the 93<1/o that require no trial. We now turn to the dynamics. It 
is an unfortunate fact that settlement typically comes "on the steps 
of the courthouse." Phrased differently, it is the imminence of trial, 
rather than the trial itself, that is the great terminator. Thus, a short-
age of judges results in long delays even for the huge volume of cases 
for which no trial will ever be necessary. 
Whether these benefits will in fact be realized turns in large measure 
on whether court-annexed arbitration results in fewer formal trials than 
would be required without arbitration. 24 To answer this question it is 
necessary to determine if trial de novo is demanded routinely, or phrased 
REMARKS PERTAINING TO COMPULSORY ARBITRATION, FIRST DECADE: 1958 TO 1967, COUNTY COURT 
OF PHILADELPHIA, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION DIVISION 5 (1968). 
See also E. loHNSON, V. KANTOR & E. SCHWARTZ, OUTSIDE THE COURTS: A SURVEY OF 
DIVERSION ALTERNATIVES IN CIVIL CASES 42-43, 48-49 (1977) (discussing lawyers' motivation and 
perspectives on compulsory arbitration). 
21. The Retainer Supplement to 186 THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 6, 1982, at 59. 
22. Address by Professor Rosenberg, Eleventh Annual Judicial Conference of New Jersey 
(May 9, 1959), quoted in A. LEVIN & E. WOOLLEY, supra note 12, at 50. See also Rosenberg 
& Schubin, Trial by Lawyer: Compulsory Arbitration of Small Claims in Pennsylvania, 74 HARV. 
L. REV. 448 (1961). 
23. DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 381 table 
C-4 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Table C-4). 
24. It is possible that speeding up the settlement process in the large number of cases that 
never go to trial could add to the number that do go to trial. Because 900Jo of the litigants 
never go to trial, the benefit of speedy disposition may be worth the added delay and expense 
of the few additional cases that do reach trial. Of greater importance is the risk that administer-
ing a program of court-annexed arbitration will invite delays in arbitrated cases that do not 
reach trial. See generally infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. 
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differently, if the appeal rate from arbitration is unacceptably high. 
In addition, it is important to know if these demands result in trials 
or if they more frequently represent tactical steps in a continuing ef-
fort to achieve more favorable settlements. 
A. Reducing the Number of Trials 
A rigorous, empirical study by the Federal Judicial Center of court-
annexed arbitration in the Northern District of California and the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that by ref erring cases to ar-
bitration the incidence of trial was reduced by approximately 50%. 25 
Of 943 cases only 18 - less than 2% - referred for arbitration in 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1979 reached trial de novo, 
with only a handful of cases still pending. It is helpful to present and 
to analyze the relevant data. 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, As of November 30, 1981 
Cases filed in year: 
Number designated for arbitration: 
Number (and %) referred to an ar-
bitration panel: 
Number (and %) demanding trial de 
novo: 
Number (and % ) reaching trial de 
novo: 
Number (and %) still pending: 
Number (and %) that could possibly go 















In the year 1979, only 30% (283) of the total number of cases 
designated for arbitration were actually ref erred to a panel. The balance 
"washed out," presumably by settlement. This percentage of surviv-
ing cases was larger than in the same court the preceding year; in 1978 
only 23% (177) were actually referred to a panel. Of those 283 cases 
referred to a panel in 1979, trial de novo was demanded in close to 
two-thirds (180). This figure in itself, however, is of limited significance, 
because we are less concerned with the number demanding formal trials 
than with the number actually reaching trial; the settlement process 
tends to continue after the demand for trial de novo. In only 18 of 
the original 943, or 1.9%, did a formal trial actually begin. 
25. See Shapard, supra note I 9. 
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It is also important to note that 35 cases, or 3.7% of the original 
number designated for arbitration, were still pending. This illustrates 
the difficulty in projecting trials saved: the pace of litigation is such 
that cases remain open for years. The best one can do is to set outer 
limits for the number of trials that could occur, and then estimate the 
number that will actually take place. Thus, as the end of 1981 
approached, a significant percentage of cases filed in 1979 and 1978 
still remained open. 26 
Analysis of the data, however, must go beyond determining the 
percentage of cases designated for arbitration that ultimately reach trial. 
The real concern is with the number of trials saved. This requires a 
determination of the outcome had there been no program of court-
annexed arbitration. 21 Reference has already been made to the 
exceedingly small percentage of federal civil cases that reach trial: 6.6%. 
This is an overall figure; the incidence of trial will depend on the sub-
ject matter of the case28 and the amount in controversy. 29 Many 
categories represented in the group designated for arbitration typically 
require trial at a rate twice as high as the overall average. Nevertheless, 
it is safe to estimate that court-annexed arbitration reduces the number 
of trials by 50%. 
The significance of a 50% reduction in the number of trials requires 
26. For data through June 30, 1982, see Broderick, Compulsory Arbitration, One Better Way, 
69 A.B.A. J. 64 (1983). 
27. See A. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 4, at 27-36. 
28. With respect to tort actions, the percentage reaching trial in 1981 was as high as 24.2% 
in marine personal injury cases, 15.1% in personal injury motor vehicle cases, and 12.9% in 
other personal injury cases. Table C-4, supra note 23, at 381. For data by district, see DIRECTOR 
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 384-85 table C-4A (1981). 
29. The higher the stakes, the greater the probability that the case will require a trial. Where 
the amount in controversy is lower, the percentage of trials that would be expected if there were 
no program of court-annexed arbitration would also be reduced as would the resultant savings. 
_ Other benefits may be greater. For example, there is a heavy price paid when litigants feel coerced 
to settle simply because the cost of litigation makes a trial prohibitive. A fair hearing before 
impartial arbitrators might be a welcome substitute. There is evidence that court-annexed ar-
bitration makes possible the adjudication of claims that otherwise would not have been brought. 
Professors Rosenberg and Schubin report "a delayed but discernible tendency [of court-annexed 
arbitration) to encourage the filing of small claims." Rosenberg & Schubin, supra note 22, at 
463. See also A. LEVIN & E. WOOLLEY, supra note 12, at 48-49. This may well contribute to 
further congestion in the courts, but can hardly be viewed as a loss in itself. As Levin and Woolley 
observe: "Resolution of disputes is a function of society and to the extent that just demands 
which formerly went unredressed ... are now being ... adjudicated, to this extent there is 
a societal gain, regardless of any change in reports of backlog." Id. at 49. 
A study of court-annexed arbitration in California found that "[c)ontrary to conventional 
wisdom . . . smaller-value suits account for a significant proportion of all civil damage cases 
that do reach jury verdict." D. HENSLER, A. LIPSON & E. ROLPH, supra note 11, at xi. These 
results must be considered in context. First, the maximum amount in controversy was $15,000 
and only "a small fraction of all suits" were found to require jury trial. Id. Cf. id. at x: "Those 
who volunteer for arbitration enter a faster track to adjudication than would otherwise be available 
to them." 
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analysis. Of course, for the individual litigants, avoiding trial can be 
expected to expedite disposition of the case, and is likely to save them 
money. In terms of the impact of court-annexed arbitration upon the 
system itself, much depends on the perspective. Alone, court-annexed 
arbitration cannot dissolve the backlogs. In a busy court, where the 
docket is heavily laden with cases not suitable for referral, one can 
readily conclude that mandatory arbitration offers no panacea. On the 
other hand, a savings of some forty trials a year should not be 
discounted lightly; this savings represents more than the total number 
of trials that any one judge can be expected to try over the course 
of an entire year. 30 This may mean the difference between ever-increasing 
backlogs and a court remaining current. 
B. Speed of Disposition 
Arbitration, properly administered, is typically far speedier than 
plenary trial. Philadelphia County's success in reducing calendar backlog 
from forty-eight to twenty-one months has already been noted. 31 The 
Federal Judicial Center study documented substantial savings in elapsed 
time until termination, but of a much lower order of magnitude than 
the high range savings noted for the Philadelphia County courts. 32 
Understandably, in cases with $100,000 or even $50,000 at stake, 
discovery is usually necessary and takes time. The introduction of court-
annexed arbitration in these circumstances, therefore, may have a less 
dramatic effect. It should also be noted as a general proposition that 
the speedier the course of litigation, the less dramatic the time savings 
that can be achieved with court-annexed arbitration. 
A great deal depends on how the program is administered. If there 
is no effort to set and enforce time limits on the scheduling of the 
hearings, procrastination will occur and arbitration may prove even 
slower than the normal pace of litigation. In addition, if the situation 
is such that delay greatly benefits one of the litigants, 33 one can expect 
30. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania averages between 32 and 44 completed trials per 
judgeship per year; in this respect it is among the busiest federal district courts in the country. 
MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR UNITED STATES COURTS 35 (1982). In the Northern District of California 
over the same period, trials completed per judgeship ranged from 22 to 38. Id. at 95. Of course, 
judges do much more than preside at trials. Terminations per judgeship in the Northern District 
of California ranged from 306 to 464 during this same period; in the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, terminations ranged from 247 to 329. 
31. See supra text accompanying note 14. 
32. See A. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 4, at 76-77. In the Northern District of California 
scheduling of the hearing was left to the arbitrators, id. at 78, which may have accounted for 
the lack of speedier terminations. See also infra text accompanying notes 33-34 (discussing the 
need for deadlines and adequate monitoring of compliance by court personnel). 
33. For example, the existence of high interest rates at the time the award is granted, coupled 
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a high rate of demand for trial de novo, particularly if there is a long 
wait for formal trial. Nevertheless, a court mindful of the factors that 
encourage delay can take steps to introduce counterincentives. 
In short, arbitration can reduce the total elapsed time from filing 
to termination, and the savings can be dramatic. To realize this poten-
tial, judges and clerks of court must monitor the programs and introduce 
corrective action where appropriate. 
C. Finding Public Funds to Make Economics Possible 
A program of court-annexed arbitration requires that substantial costs 
be paid from the public fisc. To begin with, there are the fees of 
arbitrators. In addition, personnel must be assigned to the program 
in numbers sufficient to assign arbitrators, issue notices, and monitor 
compliance with established timetables. Where the arbitration docket 
involves thousands of cases, such high volume introduces additional 
administrative complexities, which make the need for adequate per-
sonnel even more evident. 34 Even though a successful program of court-
annexed arbitration will ultimately save money, the technicalities of 
government budgeting may be such that this savings cannot be used 
to pay the administrative costs of running the program. For example, 
if a reduction in the number of trials obviates the need for the crea-
tion of additional judgeships, there is a very real savings to the public, 
but no funds are freed to pay for arbitrators or the salaries of addi-
tional administrative personnel. If a specific budgetary allocation for 
a program of compulsory arbitration becomes necessary, it will be 
significantly more difficult to implement a court-annexed arbitration 
scheme. An appropriation may or may not be forthcoming. If it is 
not forthcoming, a successful program may become impossible. 35 
D. The Practical Significance of Perceptions: 
Viewing Compulsory Arbitration as a 
Mere Aid to Settlement 
Court-annexed arbitration may be viewed as an adjudication; it is 
with no judicial penalties for delay, may encourage demands for trials de novo expressly for 
purposes of delay. 
34. Furthermore, judges simply cannot avoid expending time on some administrative mat-
ters; judges must draft rules and monitor their operation. For most programs, however, no addi-
tional judges will be required and therefore no special appropriation will be needed. 
35. Indeed, the unavailability of such funds has in the past brought to a temporary halt 
an otherwise successful arbitration program. Similarly, in the case of federal courts, a separate 
budgetary justification has been required to appropriate funds for experimentation with court-
annexed arbitration. 
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a determination of the rights of the parties by a legally constituted 
tribunal. Of course, it is not actually a judicial determination on the 
merits, because each of the litigants is entitled to reject the award and 
have the case tried as though there had been no arbitration. Thus, 
it is only the consent of the parties - the failure to appeal - that 
lends finality to the award. Some argue, however, that court-annexed 
arbitration should be considered a mechanism for achieving settlement 
and that arbitrators should not be content with simply rendering an 
award; rather like para-judicial personnel assigned to other programs 
of alternative dispute resolution 36 they should view their function as 
one of promoting settlements. 37 
There are substantial risks involved with this approach. To appreciate 
the risks more fully, it is instructive to consider an ordinary court case. 
As long as there exists a right of appeal, not even the entry of judg-
ment following a formal trial brings the litigation to a conclusion unless 
both parties consent. Although there is ample evidence that many 
appeals are filed for tactical reasons unrelated to the mertis, and it 
is well known that the delay and expense involved in appellate review 
frequently forces parties to settle after notice of appeal has been filed, 38 
these facts do not relegate the trial to a mere technique for achieving 
settlement. The trial is viewed as an adjudication, a determination of 
respective rights. Litigants are often willing to accept an informal 
tribunal as a legitimate alternative to the formalities and technicalities 
that are the hallmark of the courtroom, provided it has been charged 
with determining the merits of a claim or defense and provided it offers 
a fair hearing focused on legal rights. But this is very different from 
viewing the hearing as a means of exerting pressure on the parties to 
avoid the merits in order to reduce expense and delay. 39 To make court-
annexed arbitration little more than a mechanism for achieving settle-
ment is to run the risk of diminishing its effectiveness in terminating 
cases and reducing litigant satisfaction with the process. 40 The percep-
36. See A. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 4, at 83-88. 
37. See, e.g., A. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 4, at 88-90, 95 (suggesting that the hearing 
procedure be modified to generate for the litigants a good view of the "strengths and weaknesses 
of the case" and to promote posthearing settlement). The changes argued for by Lind and Shapard 
can, however, create more cumbersome and inefficient hearings. 
38. See D. HENSLER, A. LIPSON & E. ROLPH, supra note 11, at 32-33. 
39. It is theoretically possible to increase settlement efforts by discussing strengths and 
weaknesses of cases without coercing settlements. How much this would change the perceptions 
of the parties (whose counsel observe the proceedings in any event) is doubtful. 
40. "Opinions of the fairness of the final outcome were as high for cases terminated by 
arbitration award as for cases terminated by settlement or trial." A. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra 
note 4, at 77. 
A study of the Rochester, New York compulsory civil arbitration program emphasizes litigant 
confidence in the arbitration process. "Attorney's opinions and the low settlement and appeal 
rates all tend to confirm that litigants trust the arbitration process to resolve their disputes in 
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tion of each party is important. For optimal utility, the arbitration 
proces·s should be viewed as one focused solely on the merits. This 
is not to suggest that a losing party will willingly forego the tactical and 
economic advantage of seeking trial de novo. Indeed, the larger the 
amount in controversy, the greater the temptation to demand a trial 
de nova, regardless of whether the case ultimately will be settled. The 
same considerations operate in determining whether or not to appeal 
a lower court's ruling. Nevertheless, there is an important advantage 
in assuring the parties that arbitrators are neither mediators nor com-
promisers but are officers of the court who have undertaken to resolve 
the merits. 41 
CONCLUSION 
From the perspective of the litigants, there are three important 
variables that must be considered in evaluating the operation of com-
pulsory arbitration: speed of disposition, expense of litigation, and 
quality of justice. Properly administered, an arbitration program that 
reduces the number of trials will speed disposition and reduce the ex-
pense of litigation. The evidence also points toward litigant satisfac-
tion with the quality of justice dispensed. From the perspective of the 
courts and of litigants whose controversies are susceptible to resolu-
tion other than by a court, there is much to be gained. Programs do 
not, however, run themselves. Effective administration is essential. 
Variations in administrative detail can dictate the difference between 
success and failure. 
Court-annexed arbitration may not be the optimal approach for every 
jurisdiction, but it has been a dramatic success in some places, and 
has produced significant, albeit modest, results in others. Given the 
enormity of the twin problems of delay and expense in court litiga-
tion, it is reasonable to suggest that court-annexed arbitration be given 
the chance to reach its full potential as an alternative mechanism for 
dispute resolution. 
The need for alternative mechanisms of dispute resolution is so great 
in our litigious society, and contemporary demands on the courts so 
heavy, that any procedure that can contribute to more efficient, more 
effective justice deserves to be tried. What is at stake, as Chief Justice 
an impartial manner." Weller, Ruhnka & Martin, Compulsory Civil Arbitration: The Rochester 
Answer to Court Backlogs, 20 JUDGES' J., Summer 1981, at 36, 45. 
41. Where the amount in controversy is relatively small, so that the cost of a formal hearing 
on the merits is rendered an unrealistic alternative, there may be all the more reason to assure 
litigants that an impartial tribunal has, in fact, heard the merits and judged them. 
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Burger warned recently, is nothing less than public confidence in the 
courts. 42 
42. See Burger, supra note I, at 276. 
